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Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Leahy, and Members of the Committee.  
 
Thank you for the invitation to testify today. My name is Erica Hashimoto, and I am the 
Allen Post Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law in Athens, 
Georgia.  
 
I am pleased to offer my thoughts regarding the denial of the right to counsel in criminal 
misdemeanor cases. 
 
Criminal misdemeanor prosecutions are not minor.  They affect millions of Americans, 
their families and their communities.  They are criminal convictions with lifelong 
consequences.  The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of providing 
counsel to misdemeanor defendants, but courts routinely violate this constitutional 
mandate.  This in part is because the enormous volume of misdemeanor cases being 
prosecuted in state and local courts across the country has overwhelmed virtually every 
court system, from state courts, to county courts, to local city courts.  Lacking sufficient 
resources to resolve all of these cases in accordance with Constitution, many states 
and localities simply do not provide lawyers to misdemeanor criminal defendants who 
have a constitutional right to counsel.   
 
Before turning to the well-documented pattern of constitutional violations across the 
country, I will describe the unique combination of factors that has generated this 
constitutional crisis.   I then will turn to the evidence—both statistical and anecdotal—of 
these patterns of constitutional violations.  Finally, I will propose federal legislative 
solutions that, if enacted, would help states and localities come into constitutional 
compliance. 
 
FACTORS GENERATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN MISDEMEANOR 
CASES 
 
The constitutional crisis of denial of counsel in criminal misdemeanor cases has been 
caused by the massive volume of misdemeanor cases in which defendants have a 
constitutional right to counsel, combined with the failure of states and localities to 
adequately fund the defense of these cases.  Under existing Supreme Court precedent, 
many indigent misdemeanor defendants have a clear constitutional right to counsel.  
But although the number of misdemeanor cases has burgeoned over the past fifty 
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years, many municipalities and states have decreased indigent defense funding. As a 
result, many jurisdictions simply do not provide lawyers to misdemeanor defendants 
who have a clear constitutional right to counsel under Supreme Court precedent.   
 
The Supreme Court has held that misdemeanor criminal defendants in all but a narrow 
category of cases have a constitutional right to counsel.  In 1972, the Supreme Court, 
recognizing that the sheer volume of misdemeanor cases “may create an obsession 
with speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result,” held that every 
indigent misdemeanor defendant sentenced to any period of incarceration (even a day) 
has a constitutional right to counsel appointed by the state.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 34 (1972).  Thirty years later, for many of the same reasons, the Court held 
that indigent misdemeanor defendants sentenced to probationary terms that can be 
enforced through incarceration have the same right to court-appointed counsel.  
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 673-74 (2002).  The Court was quite clear, 
moreover, that the right to counsel in these cases applies at the time of conviction and 
imposition of the probationary term even if the state never seeks to revoke probation.  
Id.  As a result, although misdemeanor defendants sentenced only to a fine that cannot 
be enforced through incarceration do not have a right to counsel, virtually every other 
indigent misdemeanor defendant has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel.  
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).  In sum, indigent misdemeanor defendants 
have a right to have counsel appointed in every case in which they ultimately receive a 
sentence either of imprisonment or of a probationary term that can be revoked and 
result in incarceration if the defendant violates a condition of probation.   
 
In at least some jurisdictions, moreover, most indigent misdemeanor defendants have a 
constitutional right to counsel because many municipalities (and some states) impose 
probationary sentences specifically in order to collect fines from indigent misdemeanor 
defendants who cannot afford to pay the entire fine at sentencing.1  Many misdemeanor 
defendants, both indigent and not indigent, are sentenced to fines upon conviction for 
minor crimes.  If the defendant has the resources to pay the fine, the case terminates 
upon payment of that fine.  But because many (if not most) indigent defendants cannot 
pay their entire fine at the time of sentencing, they often are put on probation 
conditioned upon repayment of the fine (and, as discussed below, many of those 
defendants also are required to pay the costs of their probation supervision).  Of critical 
importance, the condition of probation requiring payment of fines can be enforced 
through incarceration.2  Because all of these sentences include suspended sentences 
of imprisonment, every single one of those defendants who is indigent has a right to 
court-appointed counsel.  See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 673-74 (2002).  
Appointing counsel in these cases is especially critical because indigent defendants 
                                                 
1   See Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, & Rebekah Diller, Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Justice 
Debt: A Barrier to Reentry 21 (2010), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/criminal-
justice-debt-barrier-reentry (reporting that all fifteen states studied in the report, including California, 
Texas, Florida, New York, Arizona, and Missouri, used probation as a means to collect at least some 
criminal justice debts from those who could not afford to pay the full amount at the time of sentencing). 
2  See Carrie Teegardin, Lives Upended as Judges Push Legal Limits, Atlanta Journal Constitution, May 
2, 2015 (documenting the number of cases in Georgia municipal courts that result in probationary 
sentences because of defendants’ inability to pay fines).   
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often cannot meet the condition of probation requiring monthly payments.  As a result, 
many defendants violate that condition of probation, which in turn lead to incarceration.3    
 
The rate of incarceration attributable to probation revocations based on inability to pay 
also has increased in at least some jurisdictions because indigent defendants who are 
put on probation not only have to pay fines but also have to pay a monthly fee to the 
probation company collecting the monthly fine payment from them.4  These fees, 
ranging from the low end of $35 per month to a high of $100 per month in Montana, 
exacerbate the debt facing the defendant, making it increasingly more likely that they 
will be found to have violated probation for insufficient payments.5  As a result, indigent 
misdemeanor defendants—the group entitled to appointment of counsel by the 
government—are much more likely to be constitutionally entitled to counsel because 
their indigence gives rise to probationary sentences that require counsel.  
 
States and municipalities, moreover, prosecute millions of misdemeanor cases every 
year, and the number of such cases appears to be rising.  No nationwide data tracks the 
precise number of misdemeanor cases,6 but one report estimates that states and 
localities prosecute 10 million misdemeanor defendants every year, which would be 
more than double the number of misdemeanor cases prosecuted in 1972.7  The 
evidence is clear, moreover, that the volume of misdemeanor cases dwarfs that of 
felony cases in state and local courts.  According to data from 2013 provided by the 
National Center for State Courts, for instance, in a number of states, including Texas, 
Minnesota, Washington, Iowa, Florida and Arizona, misdemeanors constitute more than 
80% of criminal cases prosecuted.  And in most other states for which data are 
available, roughly 70% of criminal cases are misdemeanors.8   
 
These estimates of the volume of misdemeanor cases, moreover, may drastically 
understate the number of cases in at least some jurisdictions.  This is so because they 
exclude some less-serious traffic offenses that some states deem criminal 
misdemeanors and that often give rise to a constitutional right to counsel.  In Georgia, 
                                                 
3  See Human Rights Watch, Profiting from Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry at 
51-52 (reporting that in Georgia, the only state for which such data was available, courts issued arrest 
warrants for 124,788 offenders  on private probation in 2012).   
4   See id. at 12 n. 3 (documenting the use of offender-funded private probation systems in localities 
throughout the country, including in Colorado, Utah, Alabama, Mississippi, Washington, Missouri, 
Michigan, Tennessee, Montana, Florida, Idaho, and Georgia). 
5    Id. at 24.  
6   As discussed below, one of the real challenges with understanding the magnitude of constitutional 
violations in misdemeanor cases has been that, unlike with felonies, very little data are compiled on 
misdemeanors.  For instance, no nationwide data exists regarding even the total number of misdemeanor 
cases prosecuted in this country, let alone the outcomes in those cases or whether the defendant had 
representation by counsel.  Instead, academics can provide only their best estimates of the number of 
cases.   
7  See, Robert C. Boruchowitz, Malia N. Brink & Maureen Dimino, Nat’l Assoc. Criminal Def. Lawyers, 
Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts 11 (2009) 
(providing estimate of the number of misdemeanor cases based upon data gathered in 12 states by the 
National Center for State Courts) [hereinafter Minor Crimes, Massive Waste]. 
8   Only Alabama and Hawaii had rates of misdemeanor prosecutions below 50% of criminal cases. 
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for instance, most traffic offenses are misdemeanors punishable by up to one year in 
jail.9  But although statistics available from the Administrative Office of the Georgia 
courts reflect that over a million people were charged with non-serious traffic 
misdemeanors in state and local courts, the only offenses reflected in the statistics from 
the National Center for State Courts cited above were serious traffic offenses and non-
traffic misdemeanor offenses.10  In short, it appears clear that state and local courts 
process overwhelming numbers of people in criminal misdemeanor cases every year.   
 
The vast increase in the number of misdemeanor cases over the past fifty years is 
attributable, at least in part, to the fact that in some jurisdictions, a number of civil 
offenses that had previously been punishable only by civil penalties (such as fines) were 
reclassified as criminal misdemeanors carrying the possibility of imprisonment.11  The 
breadth of conduct that has been criminalized, moreover, is staggering.  In New York, 
for example, possessing cigarettes without a tax stamp is a misdemeanor.12  Nor is New 
York anomalous in criminalizing such minor conduct.  Utah, Georgia, and Delaware 
deem virtually all vehicular moving violations as misdemeanors punishable by up to one 
year in jail.  Because all of these offenses have been designated criminal 
misdemeanors, the number of misdemeanor cases has skyrocketed.   
 
The massive volume of these cases highlights the importance of the right to counsel, as 
the Court in Argersinger recognized.  Court systems processing millions of 
misdemeanor cases risk turning into “assembly line justice” that causes prejudice to the 
rights of misdemeanor defendants.  Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36.  And in fact, it appears 
that assembly-line justice is dispensed across the country in misdemeanor cases with 
prejudicial effects for defendants.13  A report on Florida misdemeanor courts, for 
instance, demonstrated that 82% of arraignments—at which the vast majority of 
defendants resolved their cases—took less than three minutes.14  And perhaps not 
surprisingly, represented misdemeanor defendants were much more likely to plead not 
                                                 
9    See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (providing that all traffic offenses are misdemeanors unless specifically 
excepted); O.C.G.A. § 40-6-124 (prohibiting failure to use turn signal); O.C.G.A. § 40-6-184 (outlawing 
driving too slowly); O.C.G.A. § 40-6-246 (criminalizing coasting downhill in neutral).   
10  Indeed, data from the National Center for State Courts reflect that Georgia prosecuted less than 
300,000 misdemeanor cases in 2013. 
11   At least some states and localities have begun to recognize the extraordinarily high costs associate 
with deeming all of these transgressions criminal offenses and have begun to decriminalize or de-
penalize certain offenses, including driving on a suspended license.   
12  The New York Tax Code provides as follows: “Any person . . . who possesses or transports for the 
purpose of sale any unstamped or unlawfully stamped packages of cigarettes subject to tax . . . or who 
sells or offers for sale unstamped or unlawfully stamped packages of cigarettes . . . shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  N.Y. Code § 1814(a). This code provision provided the basis for the arrest of Eric Garner 
that led to his death. 
13   See Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., A Race to the Bottom: Speed & Savings Over Due Process: 
A Constitutional Crisis 15 (2008) (noting the colloquial reference by stake holders in one Michigan court to 
“McJustice Day,” when misdemeanor defendants are processed through assembly line justice). 
14   See Alisa Smith & Sean Madden, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Three-Minute Justice: Haste 
and Waste in Florida’s Misdemeanor Courts 15 (2011), http://www.nacdl.org/ 
News.aspx?id=23653&terms=three+ minute+justice [hereinafter Three-Minute Justice]. 
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guilty at arraignment than unrepresented misdemeanor defendants, nearly 80% of 
whom pleaded either guilty or no contest at arraignment.15 
 
Finally, states and localities simply have not devoted sufficient resources to ensure 
compliance with the Constitution in all of these misdemeanor cases.  Some jurisdictions 
simply lack any structure for providing lawyers in misdemeanor cases.  And even if 
jurisdictions have the structure for appointment of counsel, they have not provided 
sufficient resources to ensure appointment of counsel in all misdemeanor cases 
constitutionally entitled to counsel.   
 
Beginning with structural considerations, virtually all states have structures in place to 
provide counsel in felony cases,16 but structures for providing representation in 
misdemeanor cases are much more limited in many local (and, to a lesser extent, some 
state) courts.  This is so because many of the courts that handle misdemeanor cases 
are separate from the felony courts that view representation as the norm and in which 
counsel regularly appear.  Court structures vary across states, but most jurisdictions 
create two tiers for their courts: “limited jurisdiction courts” (usually at the county or 
municipal level although sometimes also at the state level) have jurisdiction over 
misdemeanors,17 and “general jurisdiction” courts have jurisdiction over both felonies 
and misdemeanors.18   
 
Limited jurisdiction courts, which handle the vast majority of misdemeanor criminal 
cases in many states, in particular have struggled to create structures to ensure 
representation in misdemeanor cases.  In at least some jurisdictions, including South 
Carolina and Georgia, the state-funded public defender offices do not provide 
representation in limited jurisdiction misdemeanor courts unless the counties or cities 
enter into a contract with the public defender office to cover those cases.  And although 
some cities and counties enter into contracts with public defender offices to provide 
representation, many do not.  The jurisdictions without public defender contracts often 
enter into contracts with lawyers who agree to represent, for a flat fee, defendants who 
request counsel.  These lawyers have no economic incentive to appear in any case 
unless required to do so by the court because they collect the same fee regardless of 
                                                 
15   Id. at 23 tbl.9.  
16   Many states now have statewide public defender systems to ensure representation of indigent felony 
defendants.  And although some states still do not have statewide public defender systems for felony 
cases, most states have put in place mechanisms to assure that counsel are appointed in every felony 
case.   Indeed, in 2009, every state except Pennsylvania and Utah provided at least some funding for 
indigent defense.  See Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm., Constitution Project, Justice Denied: America’s 
Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel 54 (2009), 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [hereinafter Justice Denied].   
17   In some states, limited jurisdiction courts sometimes also hear the initial stages of felony cases, 
including bond hearings and preliminary hearings.   
18  There are five states, California, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Vermont—that do not have limited 
jurisdiction courts.  Nat’l Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Overview of 
2012 State Trial Court Caseloads 7 (2014).  But because of the volume of misdemeanor cases, most 
states have had to abandon that model.   
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the number of cases they accept.19  As a result, often no lawyer is present in the 
courtroom to represent misdemeanor defendants when they appear and request 
counsel, and those defendants are simply told that they cannot have a lawyer.   
 
In many of these courtrooms, lawyers simply are not present, and as a result, violations 
of core constitutional rights--the First Amendment right to free speech, the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unconstitutional searches and seizures, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, including the right not to be jailed solely 
because of indigence—occur with no consequence.  Violations of the Constitution’s 
specifically delineated protections against states overreaching into defendants’ private 
lives essentially become invisible because the defendant does not have a lawyer to 
raise those constitutional violations.  For instance, many disorderly conduct charges 
involve allegations that the defendant directed profanity at a police officer.  But people 
have a First Amendment right to speak their mind unless their speech either is 
threatening or incites violence.  In the absence of a lawyer representing the defendant 
and challenging the violation of her client’s fundamental constitutional rights, 
constitutional violations of the defendant’s First Amendment rights remain invisible and 
never receive court scrutiny.   
 
To give another example, it appears that misdemeanor defendants in many states are 
incarcerated because of their poverty in direct violation of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), that a state cannot constitutionally imprison 
a person solely on the basis of his inability to pay a fine unless he “has willfully refused 
to pay the fine or restitution when he has the resources to pay or has failed to make 
sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money to pay.”20  But unless 
counsel is appointed to raise violations of Bearden, those errors will go undetected 
because pro se indigent misdemeanor defendants likely will never know to raise 
objections to the treatment by the government that the Constitution has prohibited.  In 
some courtrooms in which misdemeanors are prosecuted, moreover, no lawyers are 
present at all—including prosecutors and judges—to recognize these constitutional 
                                                 
19   The problems of these sorts of flat fee contracts have been documented in numerous reports.  See, 
e.g., ABA Standing Comm. On Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s 
Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 11-12 (2004). 
20  See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, “The Outskirts of Hope, How Ohio’s Debtors’ Prisons 
Are Ruining Lives and Costing Communities,” April 2013, at 8 (documenting the practice in mayor’s courts 
throughout Ohio of incarcerating defendants who have not paid fines without informing of their right to 
counsel or inquiring into their ability to pay); Carrie Teegardin, Lives Upended as Judges Push Legal 
Limits, Atlanta Journal Constitution, May 2, 2015 (documenting cases in Georgia in which probationary 
sentences were revoked because of defendants’ inability to pay fines without any inquiry into ability to 
pay).  Recognizing the constitutional problems these practices can raise, the Georgia General Assembly 
has passed legislation that attempts to limit the regularly occurring unconstitutional revocations of 
probation for indigent misdemeanor defendants who cannot afford to pay fines.  The legislation is 
laudable, and it highlights the importance of protecting the right to counsel.  A lawyer representing an 
indigent probationer threatened with revocation for failure to pay a fine could invoke both the protection of 
the Constitution and the statute (if signed into law).  But if those indigent probationers do not have 
counsel to ensure compliance with the new statute, there is nothing to suggest that local courts that have 
not complied with the Supreme Court’s prohibition on revoking the probation of an indigent person 
because of his inability to pay a fine will comply with a new statute.  See id. 
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violations.  Judges in misdemeanor courts are not required to have law degrees, and in 
some jurisdictions, no prosecuting attorneys appear.21  As a result, constitutional errors, 
even if inadvertent, are neither identified nor corrected if defense counsel is not in court 
to object to them.   
 
The inadequacy of Indigent defense budgets also impedes representation of 
misdemeanor defendants.  Many of these jurisdictions currently do not allocate 
adequate funding to cover the volume of misdemeanor cases that need appointment of 
counsel.22  In Kentucky, for example, the legislature in 2008 reduced the indigent 
defense budget by 6.4%, as a result of which the Department of Public Advocacy could 
no longer provide representation in certain types of misdemeanor cases.23  
 
In other jurisdictions, the lack of funding has led to excessive caseloads that prevent 
lawyers from providing even the most basic representation.24  In New Orleans, for 
example, part-time defenders handled the equivalent of 19,000 cases per year for a full-
time attorney, limiting those attorneys to an average of seven minutes per case.25  The 
searching pursuit of justice guaranteed by the Constitution simply cannot happen in 
seven minutes.  As the Court in Argersinger noted: “An inevitable consequence of 
volume that large . . . [is that] speed often is substituted for care, and casually arranged 
out-of-court compromise too often is substituted for adjudication . . . The frequent result 
is futility and failure.”  407 U.S. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
STATISTICAL AND ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE OF WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MISDEMEANOR REPRESENTATION 
 
The enormous volume of misdemeanor cases giving rise to a right to counsel, combined 
with the fact that states have neither the structure nor the budget to comply with the 
demands of the Constitution, has led to widespread violations of the constitutional right 
to counsel set forth in Argersinger and Shelton in states and localities across the 
country.  In stark contrast to the almost uniform representation by counsel in felony 
cases,26 every report that has studied the issue of misdemeanor representation has 
found that a significant percentage of misdemeanor defendants have no lawyer.  And 
because these misdemeanor defendants are not represented by lawyers, they suffer 
severe consequences, including unconstitutional or unwarranted incarceration.  Such 
incarceration has enormous costs above and beyond the fact that defendants have 
                                                 
21  The Supreme Court has held that it does not violate due process for non-lawyer judges to try criminal 
cases, as long as the defendant has the right to request a new trial before a judge who is a lawyer.  See 
North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).  But pro se defendants are unlikely to know of their constitutional 
right to de novo review of their convictions.   
22  Justice Denied, supra n.16, at 59-60 (documenting cuts to indigent defense funding in a number of 
states. 
23   Id. at 60. 
24   Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra n.7 at 20-27 (setting forth statistics on excessive caseloads—
including statistics demonstrating that in Chicago, Miami, and Atlanta, public defenders have more than 
2000 misdemeanor cases per year—despite standards recommending that a lawyer represent no more 
than 400 misdemeanor defendants per year). 
25   Id. at 21. 
26   Over 99% of felony defendants appearing in state and federal courts are represented by counsel.   
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been unconstitutionally incarcerated, including the loss of jobs that provide vital (and 
often the only) means of support to low-income people, the inability to get jobs in the 
future, and, perhaps most tragically, the state’s shuttling of children into the state foster 
care system because their parents have been unconstitutionally incarcerated.   
 
Violations of the right to counsel arise in three distinct, but related, ways.  First, in some 
instances, defendants are denied counsel even upon request or are simply never told 
that they have a right to counsel.  Second, trial courts in many jurisdictions either fail to 
adequately inform defendants of their right to the assistance of counsel or exert 
inordinate pressure on misdemeanor defendants to waive their right to counsel (by, for 
instance, telling defendants that they will be released from jail only if they waive their 
right to counsel and will remain incarcerated if they invoke their constitutional right to 
counsel).  And finally, even if a lawyer is appointed, in some jurisdictions that 
appointment means three minutes of a lawyer’s time, which violates Argersinger’s clear 
conclusion that counsel is necessary in misdemeanor cases “so that the accused may 
know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail 
or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.”  Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 
34.  
 
First, many jurisdictions directly violate the misdemeanor constitutional right to counsel 
by simply failing to provide counsel either at all or before defendants talk to prosecutors.  
The reports on this particular point are legion.27  For instance, a study of misdemeanor 
cases in Florida found that 27% of unrepresented defendants were not told that they 
had a right to counsel.28  The only available nationwide data on representation rates in 
misdemeanor cases come from a Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of inmates 
confined in local jails.29  Data from those surveys demonstrate that 30% of inmates 
confined in jail as a result of their misdemeanor conviction reported that they were not 
represented by counsel.  Every single one of those defendants had a constitutional right 
to counsel guaranteed by Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34.  But 30% remained 
unrepresented. 
 
And although the statistics on violations of the right to counsel vary somewhat 
depending on the jurisdiction, it is significant that reports in every jurisdiction on which 
data has been collected have demonstrated direct violations of the right to counsel, i.e., 
instances in which defendants entitled to counsel were never either offered counsel or 
informed that they had a right to be represented by counsel.30  Indeed, the Chief Justice 
of the South Carolina Supreme Court has acknowledged that her state “’simply [doesn’t] 
have the funding’” to provide counsel to all of the misdemeanor defendants that the 
Supreme Court has held have a right to counsel “and that chief justices from other 
                                                 
27   See, e.g., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra n.7 at 15 (documenting numerous instances of courts 
failing to inform defendants that they have a right to counsel); Three Minute Justice, supra n.14 at 15 
(noting the practice, in some courts, of informing the defendants of their right to counsel only in written 
documents).   
28   See Three-Minute Justice, supra n.14 at 22 tbl.6 (2011). 
29    Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1024 tbl.1 
(2013).  
30   See, e.g., supra n. 27.   
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states have told her the same.”  John R. Emshwiller and Gary Fields, Justice is Swift as 
Petty Crimes Clog Courts, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 30, 2014).   
 
In some jurisdictions, the denial of the right to counsel happens slightly more subtly.  In 
Delaware, for instance, defendants arriving in misdemeanor cases are either told by 
bailiffs, before they are informed of their right to counsel, that they need to speak to 
prosecutors, or are told by judges, before those judges decide whether the defendant 
has a right to counsel, that they need to speak to the prosecutor about pleas.31  These 
defendants are overwhelmingly likely to resolve their cases with prosecutors and waive 
their right to counsel before ever being informed that they have a right to counsel.  
Because these cases end up being resolved before defendants have even been told of 
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Supreme Court, they constitute violations of the 
right to counsel.   
 
Second, many jurisdictions have engaged in a practice of obtaining unconstitutional 
waivers of the right to counsel.  The Supreme Court has recognized that criminal 
defendants have a right to waive the right to counsel, but it also has emphasized that 
the trial court must not only inform the defendant of the existence of the right but also 
the risks of waiving the right before the defendant can validly waive the right to counsel.  
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938).  In many jurisdictions, however, 
defendants either are never informed of their right to counsel and the risks of waiving 
that right or are compelled to waive the right.  In Florida, for instance, observers found 
that in over 60% of cases, judges failed to advise misdemeanor defendants of the 
importance of being represented by counsel.32  And in courts throughout Michigan, 
although misdemeanor defendants are given a form outlining their “basic right” to the 
assistance of counsel, this “right” is never explained to the defendants nor are they 
asked whether they want to waive that right.33  A related problem arises with compelled 
waivers of the right to counsel.  In some jurisdictions, for instance, misdemeanor 
defendants appearing in court are told that they can resolve their cases that day only if 
they waive their right to counsel.34  If they refuse to waive the right to counsel, the case 
is delayed.  For defendants who are incarcerated pending trial, any delay can mean 
additional time spent in jail.  Such waivers are not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, 
and therefore likely violate defendants’ constitutional right to counsel. 
 
Finally, structural deprivations of counsel—for instance, cases in which lawyers on 
average have less than three minutes to represent their clients—represent a real 
                                                 
31  See, e.g., David Carroll, Sixth Amendment Center, The Crucible of Adversarial Testing: Access to 
Counsel in Delaware’s Criminal Courts 29-30 (2014) (documenting the practice, in Delaware courts, of 
shuttling unrepresented misdemeanor defendants to talk to prosecutors before informing them of their 
right to counsel).  See also Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra n.7, at 16-17 (documenting evidence 
that in many jurisdictions, including Texas, Washington, Pennsylvania and Colorado, prosecutors speak 
directly to criminal misdemeanor defendants before those defendants are informed of their right to 
counsel). 
32   See Three-Minute Justice, supra n.14 at 22 tbl.6.  
33  See Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., A Race to the Bottom: Speed and Savings Over  Due 
Process: A Constitutional Crisis 16-17 (2008).  
34   See Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra n.7 at 18-19. 
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problem in many county and local courts, as well as in at least some state courts.35  
Describing all of the ways in which three-minute representation violates the 
Constitution’s right to counsel would take many pages, so I will describe just three.  
First, in three minutes, a lawyer cannot know or explore whether the client actually 
committed or has a defense to the crime with she has been charged.  Second, a lawyer 
simply cannot ascertain, within three minutes, whether the police who arrested the 
client, and in many instances conducted a search, complied with the guarantees of the 
Constitution.   Finally, a lawyer cannot, in three minutes, know enough about a client to 
advocate for a sentence that makes sense, either in negotiating a plea or in court.   
 
Pelham, Georgia provides a compelling example of the denial of the right to counsel.  In 
2012, out of a total of nearly 2000 misdemeanor defendants, only nineteen 
misdemeanor defendants had court-appointed counsel.  And only nine misdemeanor 
defendants were appointed counsel in 2013.  Of course, only indigent defendants have 
a right to court-appointed counsel, so if Pelham had a high-percentage of wealthy 
residents, this statistic might make more sense.  But 46% of the households in Pelham 
earn less than $25,000 per year.  In short, less than 1% of misdemeanor defendants in 
Pelham received court-appointed counsel.   
 
The lack of counsel in these cases, moreover, has startlingly negative consequences, 
not only for the individual defendants and their families but also for the states.  As 
discussed above, unrepresented misdemeanor defendants are more likely to plead 
guilty or no contest to criminal charges than their represented counterparts.  And the 
consequences stemming from the guilty and no contest pleas can be life-altering.  To 
give but one example, defendants convicted of misdemeanors face statutory and 
regulatory bars to employment that can completely deprive them of their ability to be 
employed in many occupations, including as home health aides, as well as being barred 
from employment by many private employers.36  These consequences of misdemeanor 
convictions deprive states of otherwise employable residents who lose their ability to 
obtain gainful employment. 
 
An example serves to illustrate the horrifying consequences of the denial of counsel in 
misdemeanor cases.  A low-income single mother of a four year old from Atlanta 
needed to drive from southwest Georgia back to her home in Atlanta.  She was pulled 
over for speeding in Colquitt, GA, and after searching the car, the police found, under a 
mat in the car, the cold remains of a marijuana cigarette.  Charged with speeding and 
possession of marijuana (less than one ounce), the defendant explained to the court 
that she did not have the money to hire a lawyer, and she asked for one to be 
appointed.  No lawyer was appointed, in spite of the fact that the defendant never 
waived her right to counsel.  She pled guilty without a lawyer (in spite of the arguable 
Fourth Amendment issues related to her case), was fined $1,591.75, and was put on 
probation for two years with the condition that she had to pay not only the $1591.75 fine 
but also the city’s probation provider an additional $50 each month to “supervise” her.  
                                                 
35   Id.  
36  See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal 
Courts, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 299-301 (2011).  
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The defendant also was required to report in person every month to the probation office 
in Colquitt, which required a 430 mile monthly trip for her.  After she violated several 
conditions of her probation, the court revoked her probation and sentenced her to 176 
days in jail.  Despite her requests for counsel, at no point did the court appoint counsel 
to represent her.  The defendant languished in jail for four months, until pro bono 
lawyers who learned of her situation undertook representing her and ultimately won her 
release.  Compounding the damage brought on by this conviction, solely because of the 
defendant’s incarceration, the government adjudicated her child a “deprived child.”  The 
costs to the defendant, her daughter, and the state from that misdemeanor conviction 
are immeasurable.37 
 
Misdemeanor defendants in jurisdictions across this country have been denied the right 
to representation by counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.  The denial of that right 
has profoundly negative consequences for states and localities.  This is so because 
these defendants likely will end up incarcerated, straining the resources of their families 
who bear the brunt of their incarceration, the state that pays for that incarceration, and 
their communities, that lose them as citizens.  Misdemeanor cases exact an enormous 
toll not only on the individual defendants charged but also on their communities.  In the 
face of these widespread constitutional violations, Congress needs to act to protect the 
constitutional rights of its citizens and to help states and localities move toward 




Solving the constitutional crisis in misdemeanor courts requires two key components: 
(1) states and localities must reclassify at least some minor crimes as non-criminal 
violations; and (2) indigent defense providers need to have sufficient resources to 
provide representation to the remaining misdemeanor defendants.  At least some states 
have begun to recognize that reclassifying minor crimes as non-criminal violations not 
only can help them achieve constitutional compliance but also can result in significant 
cost savings.38  For instance, Massachusetts undertook a study in which it determined 
that attorneys were appointed to represent 59,000 indigent defendants charged with 
minor crimes that did not threaten public safety, including operating a motor vehicle with 
suspended registration or license, trespassing, writing a bad check, disturbing the 
peace, and shoplifting.  If those cases had been deemed civil infractions, rather than 
criminal offenses, the state would have saved approximately $8.5 million in costs of 
representing those defendants.39   
 
Reclassifying minor misdemeanors to remove them from the criminal justice system will 
reduce, at least in part, the volume of misdemeanor cases and will make representation 
                                                 
37   The one direct cost of the defendant’s incarceration that can be measured is the roughly $10,000 for 
her four month incarceration.  On average, incarcerating a person in jail for a year costs $31,286. 
38   See Minor Crimes, Massive Waste, supra n.7, at 27-29 (describing efforts undertaken in Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, and Washington to decriminalize or de-penalize minor offenses that do not create a risk 
to public safety). 
39   Justice Denied, supra n.16, at 73. 
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in such cases a more realistic possibility for states and localities.  But reclassification 
alone cannot solve the constitutional crisis in misdemeanor representation without 
states and localities devoting additional resources to fund indigent defense providers.  
Of fundamental importance, states must have an incentive to take steps to comply with 
the constitutional rights of these defendants, otherwise the current patterns of 
widespread violations will continue unabated.   
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE STATES WITH 
INCENTIVES TO UNDERTAKE REFORMS 
 
Federal legislation would provide states and localities with much-needed incentives to 
take the steps necessary to come into compliance with the right to counsel in 
misdemeanor cases.  I will identify five options for federal legislation, all of which I 
believe could help move states towards constitutional compliance. 
 
First, legislation providing the Department of Justice with the authority to file civil actions 
for declaratory or injunctive relief against states or municipalities that engage in patterns 
and practices of violations of the misdemeanor right to counsel would provide states 
and localities with significant incentive to comply with their constitutional obligations.  
The authorization provided to the Department of Justice in 42 U.S.C. §14141 to file 
actions where states or municipalities engage in a pattern or practice of violating the 
rights of juveniles provides a useful model.  The Department has exercised that 
authority very sparingly, and has resorted to litigation only in the most extreme cases.  
But because it has the authority to seek injunctive relief against states it has reasonable 
cause to believe are engaging in patterns and practices of constitutional violations, 
states have an incentive to comply with the Constitution in juvenile cases.  Similarly, 
providing such authority here both would give states an incentive to rectify practices that 
have led to patterns of violations of the constitutional right to misdemeanor 
representation as set forth by the Supreme Court and would allow the Department to 
assist those jurisdictions in finding ways to come into compliance.   
 
Second, legislation should be enacted to ensure that states and localities receiving 
federal funding for law enforcement and criminal justice systems are not engaged in 
widespread violations of the constitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.  
Legislation conditioning funding provided under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) program could require that states and localities receiving 
such funding submit documentation of (1) the total number of misdemeanor cases 
processed through their courts; (2) the numbers of misdemeanor defendants who were 
represented by counsel; and (3) the percentage of represented defendants who were 
represented by court-appointed counsel.   
 
Particularly given the fact that most jurisdictions now maintain electronic databases on 
their cases, requiring the collection of information regarding representation should not 
be burdensome.40  Conditioning funding on the collection of this data would serve 
                                                 
40   Indeed, the Bureau of Justice Statistics already collects this information in felony cases in the most 
populous jurisdictions, and it likely can assist states with ways to collect these data.   
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several critical functions.  First, it would provide important data (that currently do not 
exist) regarding both the volume of misdemeanor cases and, more importantly, the 
precise scope of the constitutional violations.  Second, requiring states and localities to 
collect and report these pieces of data may lead them to discover the magnitude of the 
constitutional violations which could lead to local reform efforts.  Finally, if the 
Department of Justice is authorized to bring actions alleging a pattern or practice of 
violations of the constitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, these data can 
help the Department understand the jurisdictions in which the violations are most 
widespread. 
 
Such compliance obligations, moreover, could be developed in conjunction with the 
National Center for State Courts, which has taken the lead in ensuring that data are 
available for cases in state and local courts.  The National Center for State Courts likely 
would prove to be an incredibly valuable resource as states and localities keep these 
data, and also could help make such data publicly available. 
 
Third, in conjunction with the previous recommendation, Byrne JAG funding could be 
conditioned on states and, more importantly, local jurisdictions, having an indigent 
defense structure.  Jurisdictions that do not have limited jurisdiction courts have 
reported far fewer problems with providing counsel in misdemeanor cases.  This fact 
likely is because those jurisdictions provide representation in misdemeanor cases as a 
part of their overall representation of defendants in the state.  That structure does not 
exist in most states.  Misdemeanor cases arise in county, municipal, local, and mayor’s 
courts, as well as in state courts among many others.  Some of these courts have the 
structure to provide counsel to defendants.  But many do not.  Conditioning funding on 
ensuring that jurisdictions have developed structures to provide lawyers will help assure 
the appointment of lawyers to defendants who are constitutionally entitled to counsel. 
 
Fourth, legislation authorizing funding for pilot programs in state, municipal, and local 
courts would assist those jurisdictions as they examine the feasibility of reclassifying 
some of the high-volume misdemeanor cases (such as driving on a suspended license) 
as civil infractions.  As discussed above, at least some jurisdictions are eager to 
reclassify some minor offenses, but they need assistance both in assessing the 
offenses that make most economic sense to reclassify and in measuring the impact of 
reclassification on public safety.  Federal support could help courts transition minor 
offenses out of the criminal justice system, thereby saving jurisdictions the cost of 
representation and all of the other costs associated with criminal cases.  
 
Finally, federal legislation could create a National Defender Services Center that would 
both organize the efforts of indigent defense providers nationwide and provide training 
to indigent defense lawyers nationwide.41  Organizing the efforts of indigent defense 
provides across the country would result in significant benefits to misdemeanor 
defendants by raising the awareness of every defense lawyer to the ongoing 
constitutional violations occurring sometimes before their eyes. 
 
                                                 





The constitutional right to counsel in misdemeanor cases has been ignored in courts 
throughout the country.  And while courts protest that they cannot comply with 
defendants’ constitutional right to counsel, misdemeanor defendants suffer the 
consequences of the lack of counsel.  Violations of core fundamental constitutional 
rights—including the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth  
Amendment right to be free of incarceration based solely on an inability to pay—occur in 
many courts, and no lawyer is available to protest these violations.  States and localities 
desperately need incentives that the federal government can provide both to convert 
some of these criminal offenses out of the criminal justice system and to comply with 
defendants’ constitutional rights in cases that remain part of the criminal justice system.   
